| The FULL Text of Court Ruling | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
From: Stuart Bonnema (bonnema cae.cig.mot.com)
|
|
| Date: Wed, 14 Jun 95 16:28 CDT | |
Judging from the respond, there appears to be interest, and so I
have decided to try to set a new record for the length of a post
(~700 lines) and include not only the summary, but the but the
majority and dissenting opinions of the justices.
Stuart Bonnema
Conventional Apartment Dweller
============================================================================
SUMMARY
============================================================================
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CITY OF EDMONDS v. OXFORD HOUSE, INC., et
al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 94-23. Argued March 1, 1995-Decided May 15, 1995
Respondent Oxford House operates a group home in Edmonds, Wash-
ington, for 10 to 12 adults recovering from alcoholism and drug
addiction in a neighborhood zoned for single-family residences.
Petitioner City of Edmonds issued citations to the owner and a
resident of the house, charging violation of the City's zoning code.
The code provides that the occupants of single-family dwelling units
must compose a ``family,'' and defines family as ``persons [without
regard to number] related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a
group of five or fewer [unrelated] persons.'' Edmonds Community
Development Code (ECDC) 21.30.010. Oxford House asserted
reliance on the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which prohibits discrimina-
tion in housing against, inter alios, persons with handicaps. Dis-
crimination covered by the FHA includes ``a refusal to make reason-
able accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services, when
such accommodations may be necessary to afford [handicapped]
person[s] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.'' 42
U. S. C. 3604(f)(3)(B). Edmonds subsequently sued Oxford House
in federal court, seeking a declaration that the FHA does not
constrain the City's zoning code family definition rule. Oxford
House counterclaimed under the FHA, charging the City with
failure to make a ``reasonable accommodation'' permitting the main-
tenance of the group home in a single-family zone. Respondent
United States filed a separate action on the same FHA-``reasonable
accommodation'' ground, and the cases were consolidated. The
District Court held that the City's zoning code rule defining ``fami-
ly,'' ECDC 21.30.010, is exempt from the FHA under 42 U. S. C.
3607(b)(1) as a ``reasonable . . . restrictio[n] regarding the maxi-
mum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.'' The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding 3607(b)(1)'s absolute exemption
inapplicable.
Held: Edmonds' zoning code definition of the term ``family'' is not a
maximum occupancy restriction exempt from the FHA under
3607(b)(1). Pp. 4-12.
(a) Congress enacted 3607(b)(1) against the backdrop of an
evident distinction between municipal land use restrictions and
maximum occupancy restrictions. Land use restrictions designate
districts-e.g., commercial or single-family residential-in which only
compatible uses are allowed and incompatible uses are excluded.
Reserving land for single-family residences preserves the character
of neighborhoods as family residential communities. To limit land
use to single-family residences, a municipality must define the term
``family''; thus family composition rules are an essential component
of single-family use restrictions. Maximum occupancy restrictions,
in contradistinction, cap the number of occupants per dwelling,
typically on the basis of available floor space or rooms. Their
purpose is to protect health and safety by preventing dwelling
overcrowding. Section 3607(b)(1)'s language-``restrictions regarding
the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a
dwelling''-surely encompasses maximum occupancy restrictions, and
does not fit family composition rules typically tied to land use
restrictions. Pp. 6-8.
(b) The zoning provisions Edmonds invoked against Oxford
House, ECDC 16.20.010 and 21.30.010, are classic examples of a
use restriction and complementing family composition rule. These
provisions do not cap the number of people who may live in a
dwelling: So long as they are related by ``genetics, adoption, or
marriage,'' any number of people can live in a house. A separate
ECDC provision-19.10.000-caps the number of occupants a
dwelling may house, based on floor area, and is thus a prototypical
maximum occupancy restriction. In short, the City's family defini-
tion rule, ECDC 21.30.010, describes family living, not living space
per occupant. Defining family primarily by biological and legal
relationships, the rule also accommodates another group associa-
tion: five or fewer unrelated people are allowed to live together as
though they were family. But this accommodation cannot convert
Edmonds' family values preserver into a maximum occupancy
restriction. Edmonds' contention that subjecting single-family zoning
to FHA scrutiny will overturn Euclidian zoning and destroy the
effectiveness and purpose of single-family zoning both ignores the
limited scope of the issue before this Court and exaggerates the
force of the FHA's antidiscrimination provisions, which require only
``reasonable'' accommodations. Since only a threshold question is
presented in this case, it remains for the lower courts to decide
whether Edmonds' actions violate the FHA's prohibitions against
discrimination. Pp. 9-12.
18 F. 3d 802, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehn-
quist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and
Kennedy, JJ., joined.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
============================================================================
MAJORITY OPINION
============================================================================
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 94-23
--------
CITY OF EDMONDS, PETITIONER v. OXFORD
HOUSE, INC., et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the ninth circuit
[May 15, 1995]
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Fair Housing Act (FHA or Act) prohibits discrimi-
nation in housing against, inter alios, persons with
handicaps. Section 3607(b)(1) of the Act entirely ex-
empts from the FHA's compass -any reasonable local,
State, or Federal restrictions regarding the maximum
number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.-
42 U. S. C. 3607(b)(1). This case presents the question
whether a provision in petitioner City of Edmonds' zon-
ing code qualifies for 3607(b)(1)'s complete exemption
from FHA scrutiny. The provision, governing areas
zoned for single-family dwelling units, defines -family-
as -persons [without regard to number] related by ge-
netics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer
[unrelated] persons.- Edmonds Community Development
Code (ECDC) 21.30.010 (1991).
The defining provision at issue describes who may
compose a family unit; it does not prescribe -the maxi-
mum number of occupants- a dwelling unit may house.
We hold that 3607(b)(1) does not exempt prescriptions
of the family-defining kind, i.e., provisions designed to
foster the family character of a neighborhood. Instead,
3607(b)(1)'s absolute exemption removes from the FHA's
scope only total occupancy limits, i.e., numerical ceilings
that serve to prevent overcrowding in living quarters.
I
In the summer of 1990, respondent Oxford House
opened a group home in the City of Edmonds, Washing-
ton for 10 to 12 adults recovering from alcoholism and
drug addiction. The group home, called Oxford House-
Edmonds, is located in a neighborhood zoned for single-
family residences. Upon learning that Oxford House had
leased and was operating a home in Edmonds, the City
issued criminal citations to the owner and a resident of
the house. The citations charged violation of the zoning
code rule that defines who may live in single-family
dwelling units. The occupants of such units must
compose a -family,- and family, under the City's defining
rule, -means an individual or two or more persons
related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of
five or fewer persons who are not related by genetics,
adoption, or marriage.- Edmonds Community Develop-
ment Code (ECDC) 21.30.010. Oxford House-Edmonds
houses more than five unrelated persons, and therefore
does not conform to the code.
Oxford House asserted reliance on the Fair Housing
Act, 102 Stat. 1619, 42 U. S. C. 3601 et seq., which de-
clares it unlawful -[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental,
or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to
any buyer or renter because of a handicap of . . . that
buyer or a renter.- 3604(f)(1)(A). The parties have
stipulated, for purposes of this litigation, that the resi-
dents of Oxford House-Edmonds -are recovering alcohol-
ics and drug addicts and are handicapped persons within
the meaning- of the Act. App. 106.
Discrimination covered by the FHA includes -a refusal
to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies,
practices, or services, when such accommodations may be
necessary to afford [handicapped] person[s] equal oppor-
tunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.- 3604(f)(3)(B). Ox-
ford House asked Edmonds to make a -reasonable ac-
commodation- by allowing it to remain in the single-
family dwelling it had leased. Group homes for recover-
ing substance abusers, Oxford urged, need 8 to 12 resi-
dents to be financially and therapeutically viable. Ed-
monds declined to permit Oxford House to stay in a
single-family residential zone, but passed an ordinance
listing group homes as permitted uses in multifamily
and general commercial zones.
Edmonds sued Oxford House in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington
seeking a declaration that the FHA does not constrain
the City's zoning code family definition rule. Oxford
House counterclaimed under the FHA, charging the City
with failure to make a -reasonable accommodation-
permitting maintenance of the group home in a single-
family zone. The United States filed a separate action
on the same FHA--reasonable accommodation- ground,
and the two cases were consolidated. Edmonds sus-
pended its criminal enforcement actions pending resolu-
tion of the federal litigation.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District
Court held that ECDC 21.30.010, defining -family,- is
exempt from the FHA under 3607(b)(1) as a -reasonable
. . restrictio[n] regarding the maximum number of
occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.- App. to Pet.
for Cert. B-7. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed; holding 3607(b)(1)'s absolute
exemption inapplicable, the Court of Appeals remanded
the cases for further consideration of the claims asserted
by Oxford House and the United States. Edmonds v.
Washington State Building Code Council, 18 F. 3d 802
(1994).
The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with an Eleventh
Circuit decision declaring exempt under 3607(b)(1) a
family definition provision similar to the Edmonds pre-
scription. See Elliott v. Athens, 960 F. 2d 975 (1992).
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 513 U. S.
___ (1994), and we now affirm the Ninth Circuit's
judgment.
II
The sole question before the Court is whether Ed-
monds' family composition rule qualifies as a -restric-
tio[n] regarding the maximum number of occupants per-
mitted to occupy a dwelling- within the meaning of the
FHA's absolute exemption. 42 U. S. C. 3607(b)(1). In
answering this question, we are mindful of the Act's
stated policy -to provide, within constitutional limita-
tions, for fair housing throughout the United States.-
3601. We also note precedent recognizing the FHA's
-broad and inclusive- compass, and therefore according
a -generous construction- to the Act's complaint-filing
provision. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U. S. 205, 209, 212 (1972). Accordingly, we regard this
case as an instance in which an exception to -a general
statement of policy- is sensibly read -narrowly in order
to preserve the primary operation of the [policy].- Com-
missioner v. Clark, 489 U. S. 726, 739 (1989).
A
Congress enacted 3607(b)(1) against the backdrop of
an evident distinction between municipal land use
restrictions and maximum occupancy restrictions.
Land use restrictions designate -districts in which only
compatible uses are allowed and incompatible uses are
excluded.- D. Mandelker, Land Use Law 4.16, pp. 113-
114 (3d ed. 1993) (hereinafter Mandelker). These re-
strictions typically categorize uses as single-family resi-
dential, multiple-family residential, commercial, or indus-
trial. See, e.g., 1 E. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's The Law of
Zoning and Planning 8.01, pp. 8-2 to 8-3 (4th ed.
1995); Mandelker 1.03, p. 4; 1 E. Yokley, Zoning Law
and Practice 7-2, p. 252 (4th ed. 1978).
Land use restrictions aim to prevent problems caused
by the -pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.-
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365,
388 (1926). In particular, reserving land for single-
family residences preserves the character of neighbor-
hoods, securing -zones where family values, youth
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people.- Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1, 9 (1974); see also Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 521 (1977)
(Burger, C. J., dissenting) (purpose of East Cleveland's
single-family zoning ordinance -is the traditional one of
preserving certain areas as family residential communi-
ties-). To limit land use to single-family residences, a
municipality must define the term -family-; thus family
composition rules are an essential component of single-
family residential use restrictions.
Maximum occupancy restrictions, in contradistinction,
cap the number of occupants per dwelling, typically in
relation to available floor space or the number and type
of rooms. See, e.g., Uniform Housing Code 503(b)
(1988); BOCA National Property Maintenance Code
PM-405.3, PM-405.5 (1993) (hereinafter BOCA Code);
Standard Housing Code 306.1, 306.2 (1991); APHA-
CDC Recommended Minimum Housing Standards 9.02,
p. 37 (1986) (hereinafter APHA-CDC Standards). These
restrictions ordinarily apply uniformly to all residents of
all dwelling units. Their purpose is to protect health
and safety by preventing dwelling overcrowding. See,
e.g., BOCA Code PM-101.3, PM-405.3, PM-405.5 and
commentary; Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and
Tenant Remedies, 56 B. U. L. Rev. 1, 41-45 (1976).
We recognized this distinction between maximum
occupancy restrictions and land use restrictions in Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977). In
Moore, the Court held unconstitutional the constricted
definition of -family- contained in East Cleveland's
housing ordinance. East Cleveland's ordinance -se-
lect[ed] certain categories of relatives who may live
together and declare[d] that others may not-; in particu-
lar, East Cleveland's definition of -family- made -a crime
of a grandmother's choice to live with her grandson.-
Id., at 498-499 (plurality opinion). In response to East
Cleveland's argument that its aim was to prevent
overcrowded dwellings, streets, and schools, we observed
that the municipality's restrictive definition of family
served the asserted, and undeniably legitimate, goals
-marginally, at best.- Id., at 500 (footnote omitted).
Another East Cleveland ordinance, we noted, -specifically
addressed . . . the problem of overcrowding-; that ordi-
nance tied -the maximum permissible occupancy of a
dwelling to the habitable floor area.- Id., at 500, n. 7;
accord, id., at 520, n. 16 (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment). Justice Stewart, in dissent, also distin-
guished restrictions designed to -preserv[e] the character
of a residential area,- from prescription of -a minimum
habitable floor area per person,- id., at 539, n. 9, in the
interest of community health and safety.
Section 3607(b)(1)'s language--restrictions regarding
the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy
a dwelling--surely encompasses maximum occupancy
restrictions. But the formulation does not fit family
composition rules typically tied to land use restrictions.
In sum, rules that cap the total number of occupants in
order to prevent overcrowding of a dwelling -plainly and
unmistakably,- see A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324
U. S. 490, 493 (1945), fall within 3607(b)(1)'s absolute
exemption from the FHA's governance; rules designed to
preserve the family character of a neighborhood, fasten-
ing on the composition of households rather than on the
total number of occupants living quarters can contain, do
not.
B
Turning specifically to the City's Community Develop-
ment Code, we note that the provisions Edmonds
invoked against Oxford House, ECDC 16.20.010 and
21.30.010, are classic examples of a use restriction and
complementing family composition rule. These provi-
sions do not cap the number of people who may live in
a dwelling. In plain terms, they direct that dwellings be
used only to house families. Captioned -USES,- ECDC
16.20.010 provides that the sole -Permitted Primary
Us[e]- in a single-family residential zone is -[s]ingle-
family dwelling units.- Edmonds itself recognizes that
this provision simply -defines those uses permitted in a
single family residential zone.- Pet. for Cert. 3.
A separate provision caps the number of occupants a
dwelling may house, based on floor area:
-Floor Area. Every dwelling unit shall have at least
one room which shall have not less than 120 square
feet of floor area. Other habitable rooms, except
kitchens, shall have an area of not less than 70
square feet. Where more than two persons occupy
a room used for sleeping purposes, the required floor
area shall be increased at the rate of 50 square feet
for each occupant in excess of two.- ECDC
19.10.000 (adopting Uniform Housing Code 503(b)
(1988)).
This space and occupancy standard is a prototypical
maximum occupancy restriction.
Edmonds nevertheless argues that its family composi-
tion rule, ECDC 21.30.010, falls within 3607(b)(1), the
FHA exemption for maximum occupancy restrictions,
because the rule caps at five the number of unrelated
persons allowed to occupy a single-family dwelling. But
Edmonds' family composition rule surely does not answer
the question: -What is the maximum number of occu-
pants permitted to occupy a house?- So long as they are
related -by genetics, adoption, or marriage,- any number
of people can live in a house. Ten siblings, their
parents and grandparents, for example, could dwell in a
house in Edmonds' single-family residential zone without
offending Edmonds' family composition rule.
Family living, not living space per occupant, is what
ECDC 21.30.010 describes. Defining family primarily
by biological and legal relationships, the provision also
accommodates another group association: five or fewer
unrelated people are allowed to live together as though
they were family. This accommodation is the peg on
which Edmonds rests its plea for 3607(b)(1) exemption.
Had the City defined a family solely by biological and
legal links, 3607(b)(1) would not have been the ground
on which Edmonds staked its case. See Tr. of Oral Arg.
11-12, 16. It is curious reasoning indeed that converts
a family values preserver into a maximum occupancy re-
striction once a town adds to a related persons prescrip-
tion -and also two unrelated persons.-
Edmonds additionally contends that subjecting single-
family zoning to FHA scrutiny will -overturn Euclidian
zoning- and -destroy the effectiveness and purpose of
single-family zoning.- Brief for Petitioner 11, 25. This
contention both ignores the limited scope of the issue
before us and exaggerates the force of the FHA's anti-
discrimination provisions. We address only whether Ed-
monds' family composition rule qualifies for 3607(b)(1)
exemption. Moreover, the FHA antidiscrimination provi-
sions, when applicable, require only -reasonable- accom-
modations to afford persons with handicaps -equal op-
portunity to use and enjoy- housing. 3604(f)(1)(A) and
(f)(3)(B).
* * *
The parties have presented, and we have decided, only
a threshold question: Edmonds' zoning code provision
describing who may compose a -family- is not a maxi-
mum occupancy restriction exempt from the FHA under
3607(b)(1). It remains for the lower courts to decide
whether Edmonds' actions against Oxford House violate
the FHA's prohibitions against discrimination set out in
3604(f)(1)(A) and (f)(3)(B). For the reasons stated, the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit is
Affirmed.
============================================================================
DISSENTING OPINION
============================================================================
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 94-23
--------
CITY OF EDMONDS, PETITIONER v. OXFORD
HOUSE, INC., et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the ninth circuit
[May 15, 1995]
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia and
Justice Kennedy join, dissenting.
Congress has exempted from the requirements of the
Fair Housing Act (FHA) -any reasonable local, State, or
Federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of
occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.- 42 U. S. C.
3607(b)(1) (emphasis added). In today's decision, the
Court concludes that the challenged provisions of peti-
tioner's zoning code do not qualify for this exemption,
even though they establish a specific number-five-as
the maximum number of unrelated persons permitted to
occupy a dwelling in the single-family neighborhoods of
Edmonds, Washington. Because the Court's conclusion
fails to give effect to the plain language of the statute,
I respectfully dissent.
I
Petitioner's zoning code reserves certain neighborhoods
primarily for -[s]ingle-family dwelling units.- Edmonds
Community Development Code (ECDC) 16.20.010(A)(1)
(1991), App. 225. To live together in such a dwelling, a
group must constitute a -family,- which may be either
a traditional kind of family, comprising -two or more
persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage,- or a
nontraditional one, comprising -a group of five or fewer
persons who are not [so] related.- 21.30.010, App. 250.
As respondent United States conceded at oral argument,
the effect of these provisions is to establish a rule that
-no house in [a single-family] area of the city shall have
more than five occupants unless it is a [traditional kind
of] family.- Tr. of Oral Arg. 46. In other words, peti-
tioner's zoning code establishes for certain dwellings -a
five-occupant limit, [with] an exception for [traditional]
families.- Ibid.
To my mind, the rule that -no house . . . shall have
more than five occupants- (a -five-occupant limit-) read-
ily qualifies as a -restrictio[n] regarding the maximum
number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.-
In plain fashion, it -restrict[s]--to five--the maximum
number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.-
To be sure, as the majority observes, the restriction im-
posed by petitioner's zoning code is not an absolute one,
because it does not apply to related persons. See ante,
at 10. But 3607(b)(1) does not set forth a narrow ex-
emption only for -absolute- or -unqualified- restrictions
regarding the maximum number of occupants. Instead,
it sweeps broadly to exempt any restrictions regarding
such maximum number. It is difficult to imagine what
broader terms Congress could have used to signify the
categories or kinds of relevant governmental restrictions
that are exempt from the FHA.
Consider a real estate agent who is assigned responsi-
bility for the city of Edmonds. Desiring to learn all he
can about his new territory, the agent inquires: -Does
the city have any restrictions regarding the maximum
number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling?-
The accurate answer must surely be in the affirmative-
yes, the maximum number of unrelated persons permit-
ted to occupy a dwelling in a single-family neighborhood
is five. Or consider a different example. Assume that
the Federal Republic of Germany imposes no restrictions
on the speed of -cars- that drive on the Autobahn but
does cap the speed of -trucks- (which are defined as all
other vehicles). If a conscientious visitor to Germany
asks whether there are -any restrictions regarding the
maximum speed of motor vehicles permitted to drive on
the Autobahn,- the accurate answer again is surely the
affirmative one-yes, there is a restriction regarding the
maximum speed of trucks on the Autobahn.
The majority does not ask whether petitioner's zoning
code imposes any restrictions regarding the maximum
number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.
Instead, observing that pursuant to ECDC 21.30.010,
-any number of people can live in a house,- so long as
they are -related `by genetics, adoption, or marriage,'-
the majority concludes that 21.30.010 does not qualify
for 3607(b)(1)'s exemption because it -surely does not
answer the question: `What is the maximum number of
occupants permitted to occupy a house?'- Ante, at 10.
The majority's question, however, does not accord with
the text of the statute. To take advantage of the ex-
emption, a local, state, or federal law need not impose
a restriction establishing an absolute maximum number
of occupants; under 3607(b)(1), it is necessary only that
such law impose a restriction -regarding- the maximum
number of occupants. Surely, a restriction can -regar[d]-
-or -concern,- -relate to,- or -bear on--the maximum
number of occupants without establishing an absolute
maximum number in all cases.
I would apply 3607(b)(1) as it is written. Because
petitioner's zoning code imposes a qualified -restrictio[n]
regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted
to occupy a dwelling,- and because the statute exempts
from the FHA -any- such restrictions, I would reverse
the Ninth Circuit's holding that the exemption does not
apply in this case.
II
The majority's failure to ask the right question about
petitioner's zoning code results from a more fundamental
error in focusing on -maximum occupancy restrictions-
and -family composition rules.- See generally ante, at
4-8. These two terms-and the two categories of zoning
rules they describe-are simply irrelevant to this case.
A
As an initial matter, I do not agree with the majority's
interpretive premise that -this case [is] an instance in
which an exception to `a general statement of policy' is
sensibly read `narrowly in order to preserve the primary
operation of the [policy].'- Ante, at 5 (quoting Commis-
sioner v. Clark, 489 U. S. 726, 739 (1989)). Why this
case? Surely, it is not because the FHA has a -policy-;
every statute has that. Nor could the reason be that a
narrow reading of 3607(b)(1) is necessary to preserve
the primary operation of the FHA's stated policy -to pro-
vide . . . for fair housing throughout the United States.-
42 U. S. C. 3601. Congress, the body responsible for
deciding how specifically to achieve the objective of fair
housing, obviously believed that 3607(b)(1)'s exemption
for -any . . . restrictions regarding the maximum num-
ber of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling- is con-
sistent with the FHA's general statement of policy. We
do Congress no service-indeed, we negate the -primary
operation- of 3607(b)(1)-by giving that congressional
enactment an artificially narrow reading. See Rodriguez
v. United States, 480 U. S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam)
(-[I]t frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent
simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the stat-
ute's primary objective must be law-); Board of Gover-
nors, FRS v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U. S. 361,
374 (1986) (-Invocation of the `plain purpose' of legis-
lation at the expense of the terms of the statute itself
. . , in the end, prevents the effectuation of congres-
sional intent-).
In any event, as applied to the present case, the maj-
ority's interpretive premise clashes with our decision in
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 456-470 (1991), in
which we held that state judges are not protected by the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),
81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. 621-634 (1988
ed. and Supp. V). Though the ADEA generally protects
the employees of States and their political subdivisions,
see 630(b)(2), it exempts from protection state and local
elected officials and -appointee[s] on the policymaking
level,- 630(f). In concluding that state judges fell with-
in this exemption, we did not construe it -narrowly- in
order to preserve the -primary operation- of the ADEA.
Instead, we specifically said that we were -not looking
for a plain statement that judges are excluded- from the
Act's coverage. Gregory, supra, at 467. Moreover, we
said this despite precedent recognizing that the ADEA
-`broadly prohibits'- age discrimination in the workplace.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U. S. 111,
120 (1985) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 577
(1978)). Cf. ante, at 5 (noting -precedent recognizing the
FHA's `broad and inclusive' compass- (quoting Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205, 209 (1972))).
Behind our refusal in Gregory to give a narrow con-
struction to the ADEA's exemption for -appointee[s] on
the policymaking level- was our holding that the power
of Congress to -legislate in areas traditionally regulated
by the States- is -an extraordinary power in a federalist
system,- and -a power that we must assume Congress
does not exercise lightly.- 501 U. S., at 460. Thus, we
require that -`Congress should make its intention -clear
and manifest- if it intends to pre-empt the historic pow-
ers of the States.'- Id., at 461 (quoting Will v. Michi-
gan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 65 (1989)). It is
obvious that land use-the subject of petitioner's zoning
code-is an area traditionally regulated by the States
rather than by Congress, and that land use regulation
is one of the historic powers of the States. As we have
stated, -zoning laws and their provisions . . . are pecu-
liarly within the province of state and local legislative
authorities.- Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 508, n. 18
(1975). See also Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corporation, 513 U. S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 13)
(-regulation of land use [is] a function traditionally per-
formed by local governments-); FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U. S. 742, 768, n. 30 (1982) (-regulation of land use is
perhaps the quintessential state activity-); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (-I am in full agreement with the major-
ity that zoning . . . may indeed be the most essential
function performed by local government-). Accordingly,
even if it might be sensible in other contexts to construe
exemptions narrowly, that principle has no application
in this case.
B
I turn now to the substance of the majority's analysis,
the focus of which is -maximum occupancy restrictions-
and -family composition rules.- The first of these two
terms has the sole function of serving as a label for a
category of zoning rules simply invented by the majority:
rules that -cap the number of occupants per dwelling,
typically in relation to available floor space or the num-
ber and type of rooms,- that -ordinarily apply uniformly
to all residents of all dwelling units,- and that have the
-purpose . . . to protect health and safety by preventing
dwelling overcrowding.- Ante, at 6-7. The majority's
term does bear a familial resemblance to the statutory
term -restrictions regarding the maximum number of oc-
cupants permitted to occupy a dwelling,- but it should
be readily apparent that the category of zoning rules the
majority labels -maximum occupancy restrictions- does
not exhaust the category of restrictions exempted from
the FHA by 3607(b)(1). The plain words of the statute
do not refer to -available floor space or the number and
type of rooms-; they embrace no requirement that the
exempted restrictions -apply uniformly to all residents
of all dwelling units-; and they give no indication that
such restrictions must have the -purpose . . . to protect
health and safety by preventing dwelling overcrowding.-
Ibid.
Of course, the majority does not contend that the lan-
guage of 3607(b)(1) precisely describes the category of
zoning rules it has labeled -maximum occupancy restric-
tions.- Rather, the majority makes the far more narrow
claim that the statutory language -surely encompasses-
that category. Ante, at 8. I readily concede this point.
But the obvious conclusion that 3607(b)(1) encompasses
-maximum occupancy restrictions- tells us nothing about
whether the statute also encompasses ECDC 21.30.010,
the zoning rule at issue here. In other words, although
the majority's discussion will no doubt provide guidance
in future cases, it is completely irrelevant to the ques-
tion presented in this case.
The majority fares no better in its treatment of -fam-
ily composition rules,- a term employed by the majority
to describe yet another invented category of zoning re-
strictions. Although today's decision seems to hinge on
the majority's judgment that ECDC 21.30.010 is a -clas-
sic exampl[e] of a . . . family composition rule,- ante, at
9, the majority says virtually nothing about this crucial
category. Thus, it briefly alludes to the derivation of
-family composition rules- and provides a single example
of them. Apart from these two references, however, the
majority's analysis consists solely of announcing its con-
clusion that -the formulation [of 3607(b)(1)] does not fit
family composition rules.- Ante, at 8. This is not rea-
soning; it is ipse dixit. Indeed, it is not until after this
conclusion has been announced that the majority (in the
course of summing up) even defines -family composition
rules- at all. See ibid. (referring to -rules designed to
preserve the family character of a neighborhood, fasten-
ing on the composition of households rather than on the
total number of occupants living quarters can contain-).
Although the majority does not say so explicitly, one
might infer from its belated definition of -family compo-
sition rules- that 3607(b)(1) does not encompass zoning
rules that have one particular purpose (-to preserve the
family character of a neighborhood-) or those that refer
to the qualitative as well as the quantitative character
of a dwelling (by -fastening on the composition of house-
holds rather than on the total number of occupants liv-
ing quarters can contain-). Ibid. Yet terms like -family
character,- -composition of households,- -total [that is,
absolute] number of occupants,- and -living quarters- are
noticeably absent from the text of the statute. Section
3607(b)(1) limits neither the permissible purposes of a
qualifying zoning restriction nor the ways in which such
a restriction may accomplish its purposes. Rather, the
exemption encompasses -any- zoning restriction-what-
ever its purpose and by whatever means it accomplishes
that purpose-so long as the restriction -regard[s]- the
maximum number of occupants. See generally supra, at
2-5. As I have explained, petitioner's zoning code does
precisely that.
In sum, it does not matter that ECDC 21.030.010 de-
scribes -[f]amily living, not living space per occupant,-
ante, at 10, because it is immaterial under 3607(b)(1)
whether 21.030.010 constitutes a -family composition
rule- but not a -maximum occupancy restriction.- The
sole relevant question is whether petitioner's zoning code
imposes -any . . . restrictions regarding the maximum
number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.-
Because I believe it does, I respectfully dissent.
- (no other messages in thread)
Results generated by Tiger Technologies Web hosting using MHonArc.